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I. INTRODUCTION
The “fairness” doctrine in corporate law is rhetorically glorious.
Courts speak of scrutinizing transactions tainted by self-dealing for
“entire fairness,” “intrinsic fairness,” and even “inherent fairness.” In
theory, the doctrine should be a boon to shareholder-plaintiffs, especially
* Associate Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. I am grateful
to Professors Kathleen M. Carley and David Krackhardt, Carnegie Mellon University
Center for the Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems, for their
encouragement and guidance. I also thank participants at the annual meetings of the
European Association of Law & Economics and Canadian Law & Economics
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as contrasted with corporate law’s usual tendency to defer to the
business judgment of corporate insiders. But in cases where courts
discuss the fairness doctrine, how often have plaintiffs actually won?
Are there meaningful differences in the three articulations of the
doctrine, or are the adjectives fancy verbiage? Are some fairness cases
more important than others in promulgating the doctrine? While
anecdotes abound, precious little empirical research exists to address
these questions.
This Article uses a new tool—network analysis—to perform an
empirical study of fairness doctrine as developed by the Delaware
Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery. 1 It creates
network maps to visually represent the topology of Delaware’s fairness
jurisprudence, using actual cases as nodes on graphs and
interrelationships among cases as arcs connecting the nodes. These
maps, along with metrics that describe the characteristics of the network,
provide rich data through which to understand fairness jurisprudence
more systematically.
Given that fairness is the standard of judicial review most favorable to
plaintiffs, the status of fairness doctrine has broad implications for
corporate law. In particular, if fairness ends up being little more than
rhetorical flourish, then a stark choice lies around the corner: either
abandon the notion that corporate law can help shareholders, or work to
restructure standards of review to benefit shareholders.
The hope is that readers uninterested in corporate law will find this
Article’s methodology informative. Network theory has enjoyed recent
successes in conceptualizing the topology of systems in the physical and
social sciences. But it has been vastly underutilized in the law. The
analysis of fairness is offered merely as a small legal application.
This Article is structured into three principal sections. Part II offers
background on the subject and method of inquiry. It discusses the role
of fairness in the panoply of standards of review, and follows with an
introduction to the network theory. Part III describes the empirical
methods used—from data gathering to analysis to the display of results,
resulting in three network maps of fairness jurisprudence in Delaware
case law. Finally, Part IV discusses the questions with which this
introduction begins to determine to what extent fairness might consist of
more than fancy rhetoric.

1. The Delaware Court of Chancery is the court of first instance for corporate
matters. See Welcome to the Delaware Court of Chancery, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/
Court%20of%20Chancery/. Delaware, of course, is the leading jurisdiction in matters of
corporate law. Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 474
(2005).
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II. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. Fairness as a Standard of Review
The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), like other state
corporation codes, consists principally of a series of default provisions
around which management and shareholders can, at least in theory,
contract. 2 In the vocabulary of corporate law, the DGCL is thus
principally an “enabling statute” that eschews mandatory regulation, 3
which contrasts with common law fiduciary duties developed as a means
of regulating the behavior of corporate leaders. As three prominent
current and former Delaware judges note, “what emerged as a counterpoint
to the evolution of the enabling model of corporation law [statutes] was
the second key function of the law of corporations: the ex post judicial
review of the actions of corporate officers and directors, measured by
fiduciary principles.” 4 Judges use various standards of review 5 to apply
fiduciary principles: put simply, the stricter the standard of review, the
more likely a court will question the behavior of defendant-insiders and
find for plaintiff-shareholders. 6

2. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power
and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583–
84 (2002) (“The dominant contemporary view of corporate law is contractarian, meaning
that corporate constituencies are assumed to be best able to determine their mutual rights
and obligations by way of voluntary arrangement.”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2496 (2005) (noting that corporation statutes reflect the belief
“that corporate law is, or should be, the contract that investors and managers want”).
3. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant
for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212, 216 (2005) (“State
corporate law is in essence enabling, following a menu approach that permits firms to
alter statutory defaults to fit their needs.”).
4. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L.
859, 861 (2001); see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What
Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A
Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005) (“The
‘flesh and blood’ of corporate law is judge-made. It is the common law formulation of
principles of fiduciary duties articulated on a case-by-case basis.”).
5. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 4, at 867 (“A judicial standard of review is a
value-laden analytical instrument that . . . describes the task a court performs in
determining whether action by corporate directors violated their fiduciary duty.”).
6. See, e.g., id. at 869 (“[S]tandards of review reflect significant value judgments
about the social utility of permitting greater or lesser insulation of director conduct from
judicial scrutiny.”).
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The baseline standard of review, the business judgment rule (BJR), is
very defendant-friendly. The BJR presumes that “in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, . . .
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company.” 7 As Norman Veasey, former Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court observes, the BJR “is the foundation of [Delaware’s]
corporation law. That rule teaches that courts will not second-guess
directors’ business decisions and will not interfere with investors’
expectation that directors will take honest and prudent business risks to
advance the economic well-being of the enterprise.”8 Put in the language of
torts, the BJR shifts the duty of care from negligence to something akin
to a gross negligence standard: violations are found only where there is
“reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the interests of the
whole body of stockholders” 9 or actions which are “without the bounds
of reason.” 10 Predictably, as long as the BJR applies, the defendants are
virtually guaranteed to win. 11 As such, it is not an interesting standard
of review upon which to conduct an empirical analysis of case
outcomes. 12
There are, however, other standards of review where courts are supposedly
less deferential to insiders. As Chief Justice Veasey observes,
[D]irectors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are
interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith,
act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach

7. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (“The [BJR] operates to preclude a
court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.”);
E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS.
LAW. 393, 394 (1997).
8. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 4, at 1442.
9. Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929).
10. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974). As Mark Roe has
noted, the BJR “has courts refusing to directly help shareholders who attack managerial
mistake.” Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 235 (2002).
11. There is one prominent case where the Delaware Supreme Court found
directors to have behaved in a grossly negligent manner. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985). Amusingly enough, the Delaware legislature subsequently
permitted corporations to contract out of even gross negligence, at least as to monetary
liability. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007); see also Roe, supra note 10, at
243 (“One does not exaggerate much by saying that American corporate law has
produced only one major instance in which nonconflicted managers were held liable to
pay for their mismanagement: Smith v. Van Gorkom, a decision excoriated by managers
and their lawyers, and one promptly overturned.”).
12. Indeed, the BJR “is not, functionally speaking, a standard of review at all.
Rather, it is an expression of a policy of non-review of a board of directors’ decision
when a judge has already performed the crucial task of determining that certain
conditions exist.” Allen et al., supra note 4, at 870.
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their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider
all material facts reasonably available. 13

A variety of these standards purport to apply heightened scrutiny. 14 This
Article focuses on the most stringent, fairness analysis, which is most
commonly called the “entire fairness” 15 standard. The fairness standard
applies
if the challenged transaction arises in a context of self-dealing; that is, if the
corporate fiduciaries have stood on both sides of the transaction and approved
its terms. In that setting, because the fiduciaries charged with protecting the
interest of the public shareholders have a conflicting self interest, those
fiduciaries must establish the transaction’s “entire fairness” to the satisfaction of
the reviewing court. 16

In a self-dealing situation, “the burden of proof shifts to the proponents of
the transaction, who must demonstrate its ‘entire fairness.’” 17
13. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 4, at 1422 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000)); see also Veasey, supra note 7, at 394 (“A business
decision will normally be sustained unless the presumption is rebutted in either of two
ways: (i) the process, independence, or good faith of the directors is compromised; or (ii)
the decision cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose.”).
14. See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115–17 (Del.
1994).
16. Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988);
see also Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory
Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 396 (2003) (noting fairness standard applies to
“[c]orporate self-dealing [which] arises in transactions involving a conflict of interest
between a member of the corporation and the corporation”). Needless to say, selfdealing “may be found in many corporate actions and deals such as those between a
corporation and the party controlling it, a subsidiary, a director or officer of the
corporation, or any other entity in which a shareholder may have an interest.” Id.; cf.
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, The Dividend Puzzle: Are Shareholders Entitled to the
Residual?, 32 J. CORP. L. 103, 114 (2006) (“[C]ourts police only insider deals, in which a
dominant shareholder or other insider receives corporate assets on terms not available to
others.”). Predictably, the exact boundaries of where fairness standards apply remain
murky. See Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500 n.13 (Del. Ch.
1990) (“The precise circumstances that will trigger the ‘entire fairness’ standard of
review have not been consistently articulated in the Delaware cases.”).
17. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking—Some
Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 61 (1985); see also Goshen, supra note
16, at 396–97 (“In Delaware, the most important state of incorporation in the United
States, self-dealing transactions are subject to the ‘entire fairness’ test: [t]he interested
party must demonstrate that the transaction is the product of ‘fair dealing’ and reflects a
‘fair price.’”). Needless to say, fairness analysis appears in duty of loyalty cases. See,
e.g., Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 4, at 1426 (“Entire fairness, which incorporates
elements of fair dealing and fair price, is traditionally tied to situations involving selfdealing—in other words, loyalty cases.”). The duty of loyalty is the antithesis of self-
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Intuitively, one would expect decisions that recognize fairness analysis
to be friendly to plaintiffs. 18 In a fascinating and counterintuitive
development, however, some distinguished commentators have suggested
that heightened standards of review such as fairness analysis may in fact
be little more than clever rhetoric. For instance, in the 1970s, Victor
Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein suggested that in the context of parentsubsidiary mergers, the difference between the BJR and the intrinsic
fairness standards “is not significant.” 19 More recently, William Bratton
and Joseph McCahery have put forth the notion that the Delaware
“courts garnered publicity in a handful of highly publicized cases, ruling
against management and announcing vague standards that held out the
prospect of shareholder value enhancement. But in less well-publicized
subsequent cases, they used the camouflage of complex facts to refrain
from applying the standards in management-constraining ways.” 20 This
Article’s first objective is to assess whether such concerns are valid by
performing an empirical analysis.
A second fascinating question emerges from the fact that fairness—
while most often called entire fairness—has also been variously
described as inherent fairness, 21 or intrinsic fairness. 22 But as students
learning corporations sometimes rightfully ask, are there meaningful
differences between these three articulations? Critical commentary is
virtually unanimous in suggesting that these terms mean the same

dealing and “mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes
precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder
and not shared by the stockholders generally.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
18. As one observer summarizes the divergence:
The business judgment rule and the “entire fairness” standard represent a
dichotomy of judicial review that correlates with the absence or presence of
director self-interest in a given corporate transaction. When a director acts out
of self-interest, or engages in self-dealing, that director has breached his duty
of loyalty, and the director must affirmatively defend the inherent fairness of
the challenged transaction. On the other hand, under the business judgment
rule, Delaware courts will defer to the actions of a director who has not acted
out of self-interest; his actions are presumed to be valid.
Donald G. Brabson, Comment, Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc.: “Enhanced
Scrutiny”—Delaware’s Judicial Standard of Review for a Single Bid Corporate
Acquisition?, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 141 (1993).
19. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers
and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 318 n.49 (1974). The authors do wonder, however,
whether it might be “possible that judicial articulation of the difference inhibits those
who negotiate parent-subsidiary mergers more than those who corrupt ‘independent’
management with side payments.” Id.
20. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 681–82 (2006).
21. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 721 (Del. 1983).
22. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971).
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thing. 23 But does analysis of the cases bear this perspective out? If so,
then why have courts created three different terms?
Already, then, two major questions emerge:
(1) Do cases that discuss impressive-sounding fairness standards
actually employ these standards to help plaintiffs?
(2) Is the jurisprudence precise enough to inform different
standards of fairness?
Needless to say, these questions lend themselves to an empirical analysis
of Delaware cases that discuss fairness. Before embarking on this analysis,
however, it is important to outline the principles of network theory, the
tool that will frame the analysis.
B. Network Theory
To address the two questions outlined, the analysis must necessarily
understand the interrelationships among cases. Put in more technical
terms, the topology—or configuration—of Delaware cases discussing
fairness must be mapped. This mapping might show, for instance, whether
cases referring to intrinsic fairness have tended to favor corporate
insiders, or whether cases that reference inherent fairness actually cite

23. See Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering
Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration,
58 BUS. LAW. 519, 523 n.31 (2003) (“Delaware courts frequently use the terms ‘intrinsic
fairness’ and ‘entire fairness’ interchangeably.”); Daniel S. Cahill & Stephen P. Wink,
Time and Time Again the Board Is Paramount: The Evolution of the Unocal Standard
and the Revlon Trigger Through Paramount v. Time, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 162
n.16 (1990) (“The cases refer to the fairness prong as the ‘entire fairness’ test, or the
‘intrinsic fairness test.’ The terms are interchangeable.” (citations omitted)); Harvey J.
Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 647 (1998) (“State cases use tests
like ‘entire fairness,’ ‘intrinsic fairness,’ and ‘inherent fairness’ in these situations. In
general, what these terms mean is that directors and officers will have to carry a heavy
burden of showing that the acquisition process and price were fair to the
corporation . . . .”); Steven M. Haas, Note, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe
Harbor, 90 VA. L. REV. 2245, 2255 n.49 (2004) (“‘Entire fairness’ and ‘intrinsic
fairness’ are terms used interchangeably by Delaware courts.”); Janet E. Kerr, Delaware
Goes Shopping for a “New” Interpretation of the Revlon Standard: The Effect of the
QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV. 609, 615 n.32 (1995); Jeffrey J.
Schick, Note, Toward Transaction-Specific Standards of Directorial Fiduciary Duty in
the Tracking-Stock Context, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1365, 1385 n.157 (2000); Mary Siegel,
The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 49 n.101
(1999).
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back to cases that use and distinguish the term from other fairness standards.
Unfortunately, traditional legal tools are perhaps not enough. Law is
conventionally conceptualized as a simple, static grid. As Pierre Schlag
observes in his study of the aesthetics of law, “In the grid aesthetic, law
is pictured as a two-dimensional area divided into contiguous, wellbounded legal spaces. These spaces are divided into doctrines, rules, and
the like. Those doctrines, rules, and the like are further divided into elements,
and so on and so forth.” 24 Schlag’s description should be particularly
familiar to legal educators and law students—after all, the “law
school curriculum remains largely grid-like. Then there are the grids of
student study aids—the outlines and decision trees laid out in Gilbert’s,
Emanuel’s, Barron’s, and the like.” 25 Trying to squeeze the evolution of
fairness cases into such a simple topology, however, is at best incomplete.
Fortunately, the emerging discipline of network theory can provide
legal analysts with a tool that complements the grid. Network theory
presents an exciting way to conceptualize and visualize new topologies.
While its applications might get quite convoluted, it is important to
begin by remembering that its underlying principle is actually very
simple: “At its core, network analysis maps and measures relationships
between, for example, people, groups, computers, or information.” 26
The theory has already spurred significant discussion in the scientific
community. As the applied mathematician Steven Strogatz recounts
with a touch of humor:
In our lighter moments we play parlour games about connectivity. “Six
degrees of Marlon Brando” broke out as a nationwide fad in Germany, as
readers of Die Zeit tried to connect a falafel vendor in Berlin with his favourite
actor through the shortest possible chain of acquaintances. And during the
height of the Lewinsky scandal, the New York Times printed a diagram of the
famous people within “six degrees of Monica.”
. . . Empirical studies have shed light on the topology of food webs, electrical
power grids, cellular and metabolic networks, the World-Wide Web, the
Internet backbone, the neural network of the nematode worm Caenorhabditis
elegans, telephone call graphs, coauthorship and citation networks of scientists,
and the quintessential “old-boy” network, the overlapping boards of directors of
the largest companies in the United States. 27

24. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1051
(2002).
25. Id. at 1068. Schlag provides a theoretical description of three additional
aesthetics. In “the energy aesthetic, law is cast in the image of energy. Conflicting
forces of principle, policy, values, and politics collide and combine in sundry ways.” Id.
at 1051. By contrast, in “the perspectivist aesthetic, the identities of law and laws mutate
in relation to point of view.” Id. at 1052. Finally, in “the dissociative aesthetic, identities
collapse into each other. Nothing is what it is, but is always already something else.” Id.
26. James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal
Importance of Supreme Court Precedents, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 325 (2007).
27. Steven H. Strogatz, Exploring Complex Networks, 410 NATURE 268, 268
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Networks like those Strogatz describes are mapped in terms of “nodes”
and “arcs.” For example, legal actors or cases might occupy nodes and
be connected to each other via arcs. The ensuing graph illustrates the
topology of the network. 28
At a very basic level, network graphs emphasize that entities do not
exist in isolation, but are connected to other entities. 29 Over time their
shape and composition can evolve to reflect changes among nodes, permitting
dynamic analysis. Networks thus can provide a visual representation of
a system such as the law in a way that is much richer than, say, a grid. 30
While so far vastly underutilized in the law, there do exist a few
instances where legal scholars have applied network analysis. David
Post and Michael Eisen wrote a pioneering article in 2000 that sought to
represent cases not as simple entries in a grid, but as an evolving and
interrelated network. They performed a citation analysis of cases
(2001); see also M. Girvan & M.E.J. Newman, Community Structure in Social and
Biological Networks, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7821, 7821 (2002).
28. See, e.g., Figures 1–3, infra pp. 19–20.
29. As the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard argues:
A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric
of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before. Young or
old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at “nodal points”
of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be.
JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 15
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979); cf.
PAULINE MARIE ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 112 (1992)
(“The post-modern world is said to be ‘intertextual,’ and this means, for the skeptical
post-modernists, that everything one studies is related to everything else. . . . [T]he
world is so complicated, chaotic, and intertwined that it would be impossible to untangle
the threads that connect all these interactions. . . .”); Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of
Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L. REV. 249, 291 (1993) (“[I]ndividuals are
constituted socially and legal relations are bound up inextricably with social relations.”).
For a discussion of the relationship between postmodernism and network theory, see
generally Reza Dibadj, Postmodernism, Representation, Law, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 377
(2007).
30. More subtly, network theory can provide localized spatial narratives at an
intermediate level of analysis that permits analysis of groups and organizations.
Traditional legal analysis tends to occur at two extremes: either isolated actors (for
example, the tortfeasor or the shareholder), or society at large (for example, the state or
the nation). By contrast, the law has not been very sophisticated in analyzing
intermediate level entities such as firms. See generally Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the
Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459 (2005) (discussing the concept of the firm in various
economic and psychological frameworks); see also Janine R. Wedel et al., Toward an
Anthropology of Public Policy, 600 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 30, 41 (2005)
(“The value of a theoretical and methodological framework that can both dissect and
connect levels (such as local and global) and spheres (such as state and private) is
difficult to overstate in a multilayered and rapidly changing world.”).
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decided in 1930, 1950, 1970, and 1980 by the New York Court of
Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The analysis found that a very small number of cases received a
disproportionately large percentage of citations, whereas the vast
majority of cases were cited very infrequently. 31
In other words, there are a few very well-connected nodes that
determine the topology of the network and very many smaller ones
scattered about. Their findings match those of scientists studying physical
phenomena, namely, that “some nodes are more highly connected than
others are. . . . [T]here are a few nodes with many links.”32 These networks
are typically modeled using what mathematicians call “power-law”
distributions where a small number of nodes have many arcs connecting
them to other nodes, but the vast majority of nodes have exponentially
fewer connections. 33
More recent research is confirming Post and Eisen’s insight. Thomas
Smith has begun mapping the “web of law”—the citation frequency of a
broad range of state and federal cases to find similarly skewed
patterns. 34 The United States Supreme Court, given its importance, has
been the subject of the most detailed analyses to date. Scholars
analyzing its citation patterns have found results consistent with Smith’s
broader inquiry. 35 A common, although perhaps surprising, theme is
emerging among this new research. Namely, “the vast majority of
decisions are cited by only a few cases, but there are a few decisions that
are widely cited. Similarly, most decisions contain only a few citations,
but there are a few decisions that cite a large number of cases.” 36 In
31. See David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long Is the Coastline of the Law?
Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545, 570–79
(2000).
32. Strogatz, supra note 27, at 274.
33. Network theorists often label these networks as “‘scale-free,’ by analogy with
fractals, phase transitions and other situations where power laws arise and no single
characteristic scale can be defined.” Id.; see also Post & Eisen, supra note 31, at 559
(“The idea that legal doctrine and argumentation, like so much of the physical and
biological world, is generated by a recursive process and has a kind of fractal structure is
certainly a powerful and intriguing metaphor.”).
34. See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 310–16
(2007).
35. See, e.g., Seth J. Chandler, The Network Structure of Supreme Court
Jurisprudence (Univ. of Houston Pub. Law and Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 2005-W01, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=742065; Frank B.
Cross et al., The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law 10 (June 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=909217 (“The distribution of citation references is highly
skewed. Only two percent of the total number of decided [United States Supreme Court]
cases receives fifty-six percent of all citations in the network. Roughly 28,000 cases [out
of 47,869] have been cited only once.”); Fowler et al., supra note 26, at 325, 344.
36. James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent:
A Network Analysis, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16, 18 (2008).
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other words, the degree distributions exhibit what is called a power-law
tail. In turn, this power-law tail “suggests that there is something
systematic about the evolution of law that mimics the evolution of
other network phenomena.” 37
A third question thus emerges:
(3) Does Delaware case law around fairness exhibit a skewed
distribution resembling a power law?
This question is important and worth addressing, especially since its
answer will emerge largely from network analysis necessary to address
the first two questions. But the third question is also the easiest of the
three. After all, it can be addressed through brute force: by mechanically
scanning case citation patterns without regard to whether the cited case
actually stands for the proposition it is cited for, or even whether the
citation is positive or negative. In other words, it simply tests the power-law
hypothesis against a new set of cases. The first and second questions, on
the other hand, present a significant extension in methodology from
previous studies since they necessarily delve into the context in which a
case is cited. 38 All three questions are worth analyzing, but the first two
are arguably more novel and challenging.
III. EMPIRICAL METHODS
To address these three questions, this Article performs an empirical
analysis of Delaware cases that discuss the three standards of fairness.
As with empirical work generally, three steps frame the effort: gathering
the data, analyzing it, and displaying the results.

37. Fowler et al., supra note 26, at 344. Network analysis is inherently
interdisciplinary and requires insights from a variety of disciplines, including computer
science, applied mathematics, sociology, statistical physics, and anthropology. A
wonderful opportunity thus emerges for legal academics to collaborate with scholars
from a variety of other disciplines from both the physical and social sciences. Cf.
BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 50 (Catherine Porter trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 1993) (1991) (“In what world are these multitudes to be housed? Are we in
the realm of biology, sociology, natural history, ethics, sociobiology?”).
38. Cf. Fowler & Jeon, supra note 36, at 29 (noting how, in future work, they
would “like to examine the role of context in the citation network. . . . We believe that a
contextual exploration of the positive and negative nature of each citation . . . may yield
additional insights into the network of precedent and its effect on the relative importance
of cited decisions.”).
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First, a universe of cases was defined and its features collected.
Occurrences of the terms “entire fairness,” “inherent fairness,” and
“intrinsic fairness” were searched in all opinions of the Delaware
Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery that are available
electronically on LexisNexis. 39 Cases were excluded where the terms
were used in contexts that did not have to do with judicial review of
fiduciary duties of corporate insiders. 40
For each case within each fairness standard, two subsets of data are
collected. The first set helps to describe the case itself: its name, the
date it was decided, the court that decided it, whether the portion of the
opinion having to do with fairness analysis ended up helping the plaintiff
or the defendant, 41 and the phase of litigation during which the opinion
arose. 42 Table 1 provides a high-level overview of the universe of cases
analyzed.
TABLE 1
OVERVIEW OF CASES
Inherent
Fairness

Intrinsic
Fairness

Entire
Fairness

Cases

Years

Del. Supreme Court

11

39%

25

32%

68

20%

Del. Court of Chancery

17

61%

51

65%

261

78%

Total Delaware Courts

28

100%

76

96%

329

98%

Non-Delaware Courts

0

0%

3

4%

6

2%

Total cases (nodes)

28

100%

79

100%

335

100%

1952–2006

1922–2002

1921–2006

39. More specifically, I use the “DECTS” file within the “STATES” library. This
file includes Delaware Supreme Court opinions from 1832 and Court of Chancery
opinions beginning in 1814. Interestingly, however, the earliest cases mentioning
fairness date from the early twentieth century. See Table 1.
40. Notably, where the terms were used in the context of class certifications,
settlements, or unincorporated associations.
41. The cases that are defendant-friendly are subdivided into two categories: those
in which the court noted that the fairness standard is inapplicable, and those in which the
standard was held applicable but met by the defendants.
42. For example, whether the case concerns a preliminary injunction, a motion to
dismiss, summary judgment, or a decision after trial.
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This table accords with intuition along both its horizontal and vertical
dimensions: most cases analyzing fairness are entire fairness cases, 43
and the Chancery Court adjudicates the bulk of corporate law cases. 44
The second subset of data describes the interrelationships among cases
by creating an N x N matrix 45 that lists the cases both vertically and
horizontally. Every time a case in a row cites another case as part of its
fairness analysis, an indication is made in the column corresponding to
the cited case. 46
Once the data has been gathered, the second step is to analyze it.
Spreadsheets and other conventional software programs are unfortunately
not designed for network analysis. As a consequence, the data in the
spreadsheet was reformatted and fed into Pajek, specialized software
designed to analyze networks. 47 Note, of course, that the first data
subset defined above supplies the characteristics of the nodes (vertices)
in the network. The second subset defines the arcs (lines) emanating
from citing case to cited case. Together, this data specifies the topology
of the network. The specialized software processes these data points and
generates graphs, as well as some mathematical metrics that capture the
principal features of the network.
Thirdly and finally, the network analysis needs to be displayed in a
user-friendly manner. To try to achieve aesthetically pleasing images,
the output of the network analysis was fed into specialized graphical
software 48 able to generate graphs in scalable vector graphics (SVG). 49
43. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
44. As Chief Justice Veasey reminds us, “Delaware corporate jurisprudence is
authoritatively framed, in part, by a discrete number of decisions of the Delaware
Supreme Court. It is also framed, in part, by a plethora of Delaware Court of Chancery
decisions . . . .” Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 4, at 1401. A case that discusses
more than one standard appears separately in the analysis for each standard. For
example, a case that discusses all three fairness standards will appear in each of the
“entire fairness,” “intrinsic fairness,” and “inherent fairness” analyses.
45. N, of course, represents the total number of cases within each of the three
standards. Namely, 28 for “inherent fairness,” 79 for “intrinsic fairness,” and 335 for
“entire fairness.”
46. More than half of the cells in the matrix will necessarily remain empty: the
diagonal is empty because a case cannot refer to itself; moreover, a case cannot refer to a
case that occurs later in time.
47. Pajek, developed at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, has recently
emerged as a leading network analysis package in large part due to its ability to analyze
very large networks. See Networks/Pajek: Program for Large Network Analysis,
http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
48. Unfortunately, the graphical output from the network analysis software is
difficult to read. For example, diagrams are off-center and have awkward aspect ratios.
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The results of these efforts are represented visually using three network
diagrams, one for each of the three standards.50 A circular node, proportional
in size to the frequency with which it is cited, represents each case. Nodes
are color coded: blue nodes represent cases where fairness analysis was
employed in a plaintiff-friendly manner; red or yellow nodes, where it
was used to support a defendant-friendly conclusion. Yellow denotes
situations where a fairness standard was discussed but not applied; red,
where the court applied a fairness standard, but determined that the
defendants had met it.
Interrelationships among the cases are shown using arcs. Black lines
depict citations that are linguistically consistent; for example, a line
might denote that a case cited for its entire fairness analysis actually did
discuss entire fairness. On the other hand, light grey lines depict citations
that are linguistically inconsistent; for example, where a case cited for its
discussion of entire fairness actually discussed another standard. 51
Finally, there are a very small number of citations to non-Delaware
cases—these are represented using dashed lines.
The graphs (Figures 1–3) depict a two-dimensional network layout as
generated using the Kamada-Kawai spring embedder algorithm, familiar
to network analysts. 52 Happily, insights into the three questions that
drive this Article emerge from these graphs and the metrics generated by
the network analysis software.
IV. FINDINGS
At this point, it is perhaps worth repeating the three questions that
drive this article:
(1)
(2)

Do cases that discuss impressive-sounding fairness standards
actually employ these standards to help plaintiffs?
Is the jurisprudence precise enough to inform different
standards of fairness?

49. Traditional bitmap images that are readable by most Windows-based programs
cannot be accurately scaled to different display sizes. As a consequence, SVG images
were generated and outputted to the familiar portable document format (PDF).
50. Figure 1 displays “inherent fairness,” Figure 2 “intrinsic fairness,” and Figure 3
“entire fairness.” See infra pp. 19–20.
51. Such as “intrinsic fairness” or “inherent fairness” or “fairness” generically.
52. In network drawing,
[t]he most important principle states that the distance between vertices should
express the strength or number of their ties as closely as possible. . . .
[V]ertices that are connected should be drawn closer together than vertices that
are not related. A good drawing minimizes the variation in the length of lines.
WOUTER DE NOOY ET AL., EXPLORATORY SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH PAJEK 14
(2005). For a discussion of Kamada-Kawai, see id. at 16–17.
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(3)

Does Delaware case law around fairness exhibit a skewed
distribution resembling a power law?

This section addresses each question.
A. Do Fairness Standards Actually Help Plaintiffs?
I address this question using both basic statistics and visual inspection
of the network topologies. Each source provides a set of insights.
First, and most simply, the number of cases in which courts used
fairness standards in a plaintiff-friendly manner can be compared to
those in which courts discussed fairness standards but the standard ended
up not helping the plaintiff. This latter category is further divided into
two subcategories: cases in which the standard was discussed but not
applied, and cases in which the standard was applied and deemed met by
the defendants. Table 2a provides a summary of this analysis.
TABLE 2A
CASE OUTCOMES
Inherent

Intrinsic

Entire

Fairness

Fairness

Fairness

Outcome
Plaintiff-friendly

16

57%

30

38%

127

38%

Defendant-friendly
Standard not applied

6

21%

32

41%

139

41%

Standard applied and met

4

14%

15

19%

39

12%

Total defendant-friendly

10

36%

47

59%

178

53%

Neither

2

7%

2

3%

30

9%

Interestingly, except for the relatively few cases comprising inherent
fairness analysis, in a majority of cases discussing intrinsic fairness and
entire fairness these fairness standards ended up not helping plaintiffs.
Table 2a also shows that defendant-friendly cases split into two
subcategories. The first, and most common, is for the court simply to
note that the standard is inapplicable. The most popular technique is for
a director or officer to obtain approval from a putatively “independent”
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body 53 —shareholders or the board, or even a special committee composed
of “disinterested” board members. 54 This procedure conveniently
lowers the standard of review to the BJR. 55 Other, most esoteric,
possibilities include structuring a minority freezeout as a tender offer
rather than a merger56 or using the short-form merger statute to elude
fairness review. 57 The second, less prevalent, method is for a court to
acknowledge the applicability of the standard, but argue that it has
been met. Most commonly, this pattern occurs when a controlling
shareholder shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff by obtaining
approval from an “independent” body. 58
53. See, e.g., Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J.
CORP. L. 333, 334 (2002); Charles M. Yablon, On the Allocation of Burdens of Proof in
Corporate Law: An Essay on Fairness and Fuzzy Sets, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 501
(1991) (“Interested-director transactions constitute a breach of fiduciary duty unless they
are ‘intrinsically fair’ to the corporation. Transactions subject to the business judgment
rule, in contrast, or those ratified by the appropriate disinterested groups, only breach
management’s fiduciary duty if they involve ‘waste’ or a ‘gift’ of corporate assets.”
(footnotes omitted)).
54. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983); In re
W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192, at *25–26 (Del. Ch. May
22, 2000).
55. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 (Del. Ch. May
24, 2000). This procedure has even been codified in Delaware’s safe harbor statute. The
statute states in relevant part:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its
directors or officers, . . . shall be void or voidable solely for this reason . . .
if:
(1) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are
known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or
committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the
affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors . . . ; or
(2) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are
known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract
or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the
shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time
it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a
committee or the shareholders.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2007) (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., In re Aquila Inc. S’holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184, 190 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(“Any assessment of the merits of plaintiffs’ claims must begin with a recognition that
Delaware law does not impose a duty of entire fairness on controlling stockholders
making a non-coercive tender or exchange offer to acquire shares directly from the
minority holders.”); In re Siliconix Inc., S’holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787,
at *6 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
57. See, e.g., Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 54 n.19 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“By a pure
§ 253 [short-form] merger, I refer to a § 253 merger that is not part of an integrated
transaction that is appropriately subject to challenge under the entire fairness standard.”).
58. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del.
1994).
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A further inquiry involves asking whether these results depend upon
the phase of litigation. To address this question, cases were categorized
into four phases: preliminary injunction, motion to dismiss, summary
judgment, and post-trial. Table 2b summarizes the results.
TABLE 2B
CASES BY PHASE
Phase

Inherent

Intrinsic

Entire

Fairness

Fairness

Fairness

Preliminary injunction

4

14%

19

24%

59

18%

Motion to dismiss

8

29%

16

20%

112

33%

Summary judgment

4

14%

15

19%

65

19%

Post-trial

12

43%

29

37%

99

30%

Next, the statistical capabilities of the Pajek network analysis software
were used to see whether there exists a statistically significant correlation
between phase and outcome. Rajski’s information indices were computed,
in both symmetrical and asymmetrical versions,59 with the results displayed
in Table 2c.

The initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party who
stands on both sides of the transaction. However, an approval of the
transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority
of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness
from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholderplaintiff.
Id. (citations omitted).
59. Rajski’s indices measure the degree to which the information in one
classification is preserved in the other classification. It has three variants: a
symmetrical version, represented by (C1 ↔ C2) in the output of Pajek, and
two asymmetrical versions, which indicate the extent to which the first
classification can be predicted by the second (C1 ← C2) or the second
classification can be predicted by the first (C1 → C2).
DE NOOY ET AL., supra note 52, at 50–51. Here, phase is denoted as C1 and outcome as C2.
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TABLE 2C
RAJSKI’S INFORMATION INDICES
Inherent

Intrinsic

Entire

Fairness

Fairness

Fairness

Phase ↔ Outcome

0.0745

0.0140

0.0175

Phase → Outcome

0.1487

0.0308

0.0365

Phase ← Outcome

0.1300

0.0252

0.0324

Rajski’s indices are low, indicating that the outcomes are all but independent
of phase. 60
Beyond statistical calculations, the network topologies offer additional
insight. First, visual inspection of the maps, especially those for intrinsic
fairness (Figure 2) and entire fairness (Figure 3) show a large number of
defendant-friendly cases, as represented by yellow and red nodes.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the diagrams is the relative size of
the blue versus the yellow and red nodes. The largest nodes—the size of
the node being proportional to the number of citations it receives—are
blue, indicating plaintiff-friendly cases. These landmark cases are, quite
predictably, those we teach in corporate law: Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 61 Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. 62 and the like.
Not discussed in a typical treatment of corporate law, however, are the
large number of defendant-friendly cases, not as well-cited, but more
numerous. These are represented by the plethora of smaller red and
yellow nodes which pepper the diagrams. Put simply, while plaintifffriendly cases tend to garner a lot of attention as measured by inward
citations, they are outnumbered in a landscape littered with defendantfriendly cases. By focusing on the larger plaintiff-friendly blue nodes,
perhaps we are missing the overall, more defendant-friendly, picture.

60. Tables A1–A3, which summarize case outcomes by phase, provide more detail
and are provided in the Appendix to this Article. In particular, they shed some light on
why the indices for inherent fairness are somewhat higher. As Table A1 demonstrates,
this is likely due to a greater number of plaintiff-friendly cases in the early stages of
litigation. While this raises a plausible hypothesis that courts are friendlier to plaintiffs
in the early stages of litigation, the inherent fairness analysis is based on a small case
universe. Moreover, intrinsic fairness and entire fairness cases do not exhibit a similar
pattern. See Tables A2–A3, infra pp. 31–32.
61. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
62. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
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Where does this leave us in terms of observations such as those by
Brudney and Chirelstein63 and Bratton and McCahery64 discussed above?
It is fair perhaps to say that, in distinction to Brudney and Chirelstein’s
assertion, the difference between the BJR and a standard such as
intrinsic fairness is indeed “significant.” 65 If the standard of review is
the BJR, the defendant is virtually guaranteed to win; whereas with the
fairness standards, plaintiffs at least have a chance, especially if the
defendants have not been clever enough to use procedural techniques. 66
Bratton and McCahery’s assertion, on the other hand, seems to capture
the empirical reality quite nicely: the “highly publicized cases, ruling
against management” 67 are the large blue nodes on the diagram; the
63.
64.
65.
66.
text.
67.

20

Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 19.
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20.
See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 19, at 318 n.49.
For examples of such techniques, see supra notes 53–58 and accompanying
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20, at 681–82.
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“less well-publicized subsequent cases, . . . [which] refrain from
applying the standards in management-constraining ways” 68 are the
numerous smaller yellow and red nodes. It is, of course, difficult to
judge a priori the merits of each individual case and the incentives to
bring suit. But the very fact that even the most heightened standard of
scrutiny often favors defendants seems instructive. 69
In sum, despite a number of high profile cases articulating plaintifffriendly standards, the prospects for fairness review as a check on insider
misbehavior look mixed. These findings fit within the broader reality of
limiting judicial review in corporate law. As one commentator laments:
Over time, state courts interpreted the [fiduciary] duties in a manner that left
little substance. The business judgment rule and universal adoption of waiver of
liability provisions all but eliminated causes of action for breach of the duty of
care. The duty of loyalty, particularly self-dealing by officers and directors,
could be validated through procedural mechanisms. With proper procedures,
the fairness of the transaction was not subject to judicial review. This approach
allowed self-dealing by officers and directors almost without limits. 70

Such a sobering view of the way in which procedural mechanisms can
effectively eviscerate the most heightened form of scrutiny leads one to
question the bite that Delaware case law has in constraining opportunistic
managers. Indeed, commentators suggest that investors “seem to consider
the Delaware courts’ decisions to be inconsequential as regards shareholders’
wealth and, by implication, largely indeterminate of the outcome of
future cases.” 71 And in his detailed study of how Delaware case law is
actually made, Edward Rock puts things succinctly by noting that “we
come much closer to understanding the role of courts in corporate law if

68. Id.
69. One might conceivably argue that the relevant cases are simply those where
the standard was applied in a plaintiff-friendly manner, versus those where the standard
was applied and met by the defendant. Under this analysis, 16 out of 20 (80%) of the
inherent fairness cases, 31 out of 46 (67%) of the intrinsic fairness, and 127 out of 166
(77%) of the entire fairness cases would be plaintiff-friendly. See Table 2a, supra p. 15.
However, this analysis does not capture the number of times defendants are able to evade
the standard through carefully-orchestrated procedural maneuvers. See supra notes 53–
58 and accompanying text.
70. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 318–19 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
71. Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A
Study of Investors’ Reactions to “Changes” in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551, 603
(1987).
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we think of judges more as preachers than as policemen.” 72 The uneven
quality of the fairness standards would seem to support Rock’s assessment.
The bottom line is simple: the putatively plaintiff-friendly fairness
standards often do not help plaintiffs. A cynic might be forgiven for
thinking that fairness standards are frequently little more than eloquent
rhetorical flourish: just enough to generate the rare spectacular case and
generate a steady stream of litigation and impressive citations, but not
enough to protect shareholders in a systematic manner. While the
conventional wisdom might suggest that standards of review are typically
outcome determinative, 73 the empirical research suggests the fairness
standard is not—something at least one court has suggested. 74
B. Is the Jurisprudence Precise Enough to Inform Different
Standards of Fairness?
The second question asks whether the analysis of the fairness cases
suggests a jurisprudence precise enough to inform three different standards
of fairness review. The answer, simply put, is no: courts too often
intermingle the standards without offering useful justification. Existing
jurisprudence provides colorful rhetoric but is too often imprecise.
Again, both statistics and network topology can offer perspective.
One way to approach the problem is to consider the consistency of the
citations. Citations are grouped into two categories: those that are
linguistically consistent and those that are not. Here, linguistic consistency
is defined straightforwardly: if a court cites another case for the analysis
of a specific fairness standard, and the cited case actually discusses the
standard, the citation is deemed linguistically consistent. For example, if
case A cites case B in its analysis of “entire fairness” and case B actually
discusses entire fairness, the citation is consistent. On the other hand, if the
cited case does not discuss the standard, the citation is deemed linguistically
inconsistent. For instance, case A cites case B in its analysis of entire
fairness, but case B actually discusses intrinsic fairness or inherent fairness.

72. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997).
73. See, e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103,
111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business
judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the
determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative
of the outcome of derivative litigation.”).
74. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1381 (Del. 1993) (“In a case such as
this where the business judgment rule is not applicable and the entire fairness test is
applicable, the imposition of the latter test is not, alone, outcome-determinative. The
doctrine of entire fairness does not lend itself to bright line precision or rigid doctrine.”).
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TABLE 3
CITATION CONSISTENCY
Citations

Inherent

Intrinsic

Entire

Fairness

Fairness

Fairness

Linguistically consistent

30

91%

51

51%

680

84%

Linguistically inconsistent

3

9%

45

45%

125

15%

To non-Delaware cases

0

0%

4

4%

7

Total citations (arcs)

33

100%

100

100%

812

1%
100%

Table 3 summarizes the results. Interestingly, while all three standards
have a nontrivial number of inconsistent citations, the number of
inconsistencies in the intrinsic fairness analysis is most pronounced.
The most likely reason for this discrepancy is that two of the most wellcited cases in fairness analysis, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 75 and Sterling
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 76 do not discuss intrinsic fairness. Thus, any
court citing these cases as part of its intrinsic fairness analysis is being
linguistically inconsistent.
Network maps reveal the same pattern. Black arcs represent
consistent citations whereas light grey ones represent inconsistent ones.
Visual inspection of the three diagrams shows a greater proportion of
light grey arcs on the intrinsic fairness map, followed by the entire
fairness and inherent fairness maps. More generally, there are a surprising
number of grey lines on the diagrams.
A few specific examples might add texture to the findings. Even the
canonical fairness cases, perhaps unwittingly, blend standards. For
instance, Weinberger’s most famous passage states that:
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction,
they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. The requirement of fairness is
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction,
he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of
careful scrutiny by the courts. 77

75.
76.
77.

See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952).
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, a number of cases argue simply that the “words ‘entire
fairness’ are synonymous with the words ‘intrinsic fairness.’” 78
Perhaps this is an unnecessarily nitpicking analysis. After all, one
might argue that these three standards are about fairness in a generic
sense as distinguished from the BJR. But this begs an obvious question:
why then have three different linguistic articulations? Part of the
explanation may simply be that as the common law evolves and accretes,
inconsistencies emerge. Perhaps additionally, having these different
standards simply makes for a rich menu of rhetoric about protecting
shareholders. As three former and current Delaware judges tellingly
note in the context of the overall proliferation of standards of review in
Delaware corporate jurisprudence:
Additionally, the creation of more, rather than fewer, standards of review tends
to create a false sense of doctrinal safety, encouraging boards to act in ways
that, although enabling their actions to fall into the right categorical box, does
not necessarily create the result most genuinely protective of the interests of
stockholders. 79

Convoluted standards seem to be having mixed results in helping
shareholders. Such findings thus support a call for simplification of
standards. This would be consistent with what the Delaware Supreme
Court once casually suggested in the context of the use of the simple
word fair in Delaware’s safe harbor statute. 80 It is also congruent with
what the American Law Institute (ALI) provides in a Comment to its
Principles of Corporate Governance:
Section 5.02 [Transactions with the Corporation] does not use phrases such as
“entire fairness,” “inherent fairness,” or “intrinsic fairness,” which have
sometimes been used by the courts in duty of fair dealing cases, but which

78. Tanzer v. Int’l Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 386 (Del. Ch. 1979); see also
Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 469 (Del. 1991) (“The standard for intrinsic fairness is
the searching test announced in Weinberger. The interested directors bear the burden of
proving the entire fairness of the transaction in all its aspects, including both the fairness
of the price and the fairness of the directors’ dealings.” (emphasis added)); Schreiber v.
Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978) (“[W]hen the test of intrinsic fairness is
deemed to apply, the burden shifts to the defendants to show the entire fairness of the
transaction under the careful watch of the courts.” (emphasis added)); Trans World
Airlines v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. Ch. 1977) (“Application of the intrinsic
fairness test also requires that the parent corporation bear the burden of establishing the
entire fairness of a transaction under attack.” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
79. Allen et al., supra note 4, at 869.
80. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 n.7 (Del. 1995)
(“The entire fairness test is codified and has been construed by this Court many times.
See 8 Del. C. § 144(a)(3).”); see also Siegel, supra note 23, at 49 n.101 (“[F]airness in
§ 144(a)(3) of the Delaware code, also now means entire fairness.” (citation omitted)).
For the text of section 144(a)(3), see supra note 55.
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afford insufficient guidance in analyzing particular transactions and suggest an
often unattainable degree of precision in analysis. 81

It cannot be overemphasized that simplification cannot simply mean a
further watering down to some anemic notion of fairness. As David
Yablon argues in his analysis of the “fuzzy” nature of fairness as a
standard of review:
The case law often states that the criteria for approval of these transactions is
not just fairness but full fairness, “entire fairness,” “intrinsic fairness,” or “the
most scrupulous inherent fairness.”
Little attention has been paid to these extra adjectives, and indeed, it is
difficult to define, in any abstract sense, what the difference between fairness
and entire fairness or intrinsic fairness might be. Yet in the context of fairness
as a fuzzy property, there seems little doubt that all these adjectives function as
intensifiers to the property “fairness” and as such, send a subtle message to the
judge concerning the substantive criteria to be used in determining fairness. In
our hypothetical, the judge may be quite uncertain whether $25 is a fair price for
the stock, but as she peruses the case law, and is instructed to rule against any
prices not fully or entirely or inherently fair, she will view these adjectives as
setting a higher standard than mere fairness—something akin to a very fair
standard. 82

81. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
Comment to § 5.02(a)(2)(A) (1994). As one commentator notes:
The decisions that have addressed the duty of loyalty problem are replete
with terms such as “inherent fairness,” “intrinsic fairness,” and “entire fairness.”
Unfortunately, use of these terms is seldom accompanied by a more concrete
definition of the factors to be considered in determining whether a given
transaction is fair.
Deborah K. Hayes, Comment, Corporate Director Conflicts of Interest: The Fairness
Test and Its Application Under Existing Statutory Provisions and Proposals for Statutory
Reform, 53 TENN. L. REV. 799, 817–18 (1986) (citations omitted). The most extensive
description of fairness is nearly twenty-five years old:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The
former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter
aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the
proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings,
future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent
value of a company’s stock. . . . However, the test for fairness is not a
bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must
be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted).
82. Yablon, supra note 53, at 512 (footnotes omitted); cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719–20 (Del. 1971) (“The standard of intrinsic fairness involves
both a high degree of fairness and a shift in the burden of proof. Under this standard the
burden is on Sinclair to prove, subject to careful judicial scrutiny, that its transactions
with Sinven were objectively fair.”); Brabson, supra note 18, at 145 n.42 (“In using the
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While simplification would be a positive step, the standards must
converge to a form of judicial review that actually has bite. 83
C. Does the Case Law Exhibit a Skewed Distribution?
As suggested in Part II, this third question requires the most
straightforward analysis. A standard measure in the network theory
literature can help capture the topology of a directed network such as the
fairness citation patterns. “Indegree” is a simple measure that calculates
the number of citations (arcs) a case (node) receives. 84
The indegree of the nodes within each network reveals a skewed
pattern. For example, 25 out of the 28 inherent fairness cases (89%), 64
out of 79 intrinsic fairness cases (81%), and 241 out of the 335 entire
fairness cases (72%) receive one or fewer citations. By contrast, the top
5% of cases receive approximately 61%, 39%, and 53% of the inherent,
intrinsic, and entire fairness citations respectively. Figures 4a–4c present
the results graphically.
Figure 4a: Indegree - Inherent Fairness
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terms ‘inherent fairness’ and ‘intrinsic fairness,’ courts seem to be referring to an overall
objective standard for judging the ‘entire fairness’ of a transaction, as opposed to a
director’s subjective belief in a transaction’s fairness.”).
83. To the extent that the Delaware courts really intend for the standards to mean
different things, then it is incumbent upon them to articulate those differences. For
example, one might argue that the “intrinsic fairness” standard represents a higher level
of fairness scrutiny applicable in controlled mergers. Such a position would be congruent
with the use of “intrinsic fairness” in cases such as Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, but as
Figure 2 illustrates, the standard is currently employed well beyond the context of
controlled mergers.
84. See DE NOOY ET AL., supra note 52, at 189 (“The popularity of indegree of a
vertex is the number of arcs it receives in a directed network.”).
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Figure 4b: Indegree - Intrinsic Fairness
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Figure 4c: Indegree - Entire Fairness
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Visual inspection of the network maps supports these findings. There
are a small number of highly cited cases (large vertices), and a large
number of cases that are either never or rarely cited (small vertices). In
the language of network theory, the highly cited cases serve as “hubs.”
As discussed in Part IV.A, however, there is an interesting twist to the
story: the famous plaintiff-friendly hubs (blue vertices) tend to overshadow
the large number of uncited or rarely cited defendant-friendly cases
(yellow and red vertices). In other words, the overall topology of the
networks is much more defendant-friendly than their hubs suggest.
Notwithstanding this additional finding, both statistical and visual
analyses confirm that Delaware case law discussing fairness displays a
highly skewed distribution similar to that found in other studies of both
legal and nonlegal networks. 85
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has used three questions to frame an empirical analysis of
Delaware case law focused on fairness standards of review. First, the
evidence suggests that corporate insiders often win cases even when
courts recognize impressive-sounding fairness standards, as plaintifffriendly precedent gets reinterpreted in a defendant-friendly manner.
Second, the jurisprudence is not precise enough to inform different
standards of fairness. The differences between entire fairness, intrinsic
fairness, and inherent fairness are elusive. Surprisingly, cases sometimes do
not even articulate the specific standard for which they are cited.
Third, and most simply, Delaware fairness case law exhibits a highly
skewed distribution that resembles a power law: a small number of cases
get cited a disproportionate number of times; the bulk of the cases
remain obscure. This finding lends further support to the notion that the
topology approximates a scale-free network. In a fascinating twist, it
appears that the small number of hub cases tend to be plaintiff-friendly,
whereas the large number of infrequently-cited cases are defendantfriendly. Undue focus on the hub cases in corporate law teaching and
scholarship has perhaps characterized fairness standards as having more
bite against insiders than analyzing the entire network of cases would
suggest.
Although the analysis is at one level quite technical and narrowly
focused on a particular aspect of Delaware law, it does present broader
implications. From a methodological point of view, it suggests that
network theory can serve as an important analytical tool in drawing rich
topologies from which an analyst may discern patterns, especially when
85.

28

See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.

DIBADJ POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC

[VOL. 45: 1, 2008]

4/22/2008 1:01:44 PM

Networks of Fairness Review
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

combined with some basic statistical analyses. From a substantive point
of view, the results suggest that fairness analysis is at least in part
impressive rhetoric. Such a conclusion lends credence to the observations
of scholars such as William Bratton and Joseph McCahery who suggest
that “the genius of Delaware lawmakers lies in their ability to generate a
thick fiduciary law without at the same time imposing a significant
compliance burden.”86 The implications for corporate law are significant.
After all, if corporation statutes, the BJR, and now even fairness analysis
serve only as a limited check on insider behavior, then to what extent has
corporate law given up on protecting shareholders?
Indeed, this Article analyzes fairness since it is the least deferential of
standards and presumably thus the least likely to get watered down. But
more work needs to be done to see whether similar patterns exist across
other standards of heightened scrutiny. In particular, I will be performing
similar analyses on the other standards of heightened scrutiny in Delaware
jurisprudence: notably the Unocal/Unitrin 87 and Revlon 88 standards that
go beyond the business judgment rule in the context of change-of-control
transactions, Blasius89 in the context of the shareholder franchise, as well
as the Zapata 90 “two-step” which sometimes requires a court to exercise
its own business judgment in the context of presuit demand. An
additional avenue of new research would be to perform more in-depth
mathematical analysis of the findings. A narrow issue might be to more
precisely model the skewed distribution to see whether it is technically a
power law distribution, or another highly skewed formation. 91 More
broadly, developing network maps of Delaware’s jurisprudence yields a
series of matrices that reveal the characteristics of cases and their
86. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20, at 691.
87. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371–75 (Del. 1995);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).
88. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180
(Del. 1986).
89. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
90. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1981).
91. For example, Seth Chandler suggests that Supreme Court citation patterns
might match a Weibull distribution. See Chandler, supra note 35, at 15. More generally,
the network can be analyzed using rate equations from statistical physics. The central
insight is that in a power law distribution, the probability of attachment to a node is
linear with the node’s degree; however, there might be other distributions, although
skewed, with which the probability of attachment is sublinear to node degree. For a
detailed explanation, see P.L. Krapivksy & S. Redner, Rate Equation Approach for
Growing Networks, in STATISTICAL MECHANICS OF COMPLEX NETWORKS 3, 4–7 (R.
Pastor-Satorras et al. eds., 2003).
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interdependencies—data that lends itself particularly well to the
techniques of linear algebra.
If the empirical study of fairness is any harbinger, the results are likely
to similar: 92 seemingly impressive standards of review create the veneer
of substantive review but likely provide a limited core upon which to
base corporate governance and protect shareholders. It is no coincidence
that multiple layers of securities regulation have been necessary to begin
to protect shareholders. 93 Corporate law might be too often enamored of
its fancy rhetoric.

92. The intuition of some commentators suggests as much. See, e.g., Sean J.
Griffith, Daedelean Tinkering, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1247, 1262 (2006) (“Unocal was
slowly eroded through lax application. Revlon was narrowed.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and
Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (2002)
(“Subsequent Delaware cases have dramatically reduced Revlon’s significance by
making clear that if the directors of the firm decide not to sell, or if they prefer a stockfor-stock exchange with another public firm, Revlon is irrelevant.”).
93. See Dibadj, supra note 1.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 INHERENT FAIRNESS OUTCOMES BY PHASE
Plaintiff-friendly

Preliminary

Defendant-friendly

Neither

Standard not

Standard

applied

applied, met

Total

# cases

%

# cases

%

# cases

%

# cases

%

# cases

3

75%

1

25%

0

0%

0

0%

4

6

75%

2

25%

0

0%

0

0%

8

2

50%

1

25%

1

25%

0

0%

4

5

42%

2

17%

3

25%

2

17%

12

injunction
Motion to
dismiss
Summary
judgment
Post-trial

TABLE A2 INTRINSIC FAIRNESS OUTCOMES BY PHASE
Plaintiff-friendly

Defendant-friendly
Standard not
applied

Preliminary

Neither

Total

Standard
applied, met

# cases

%

# cases

%

# cases

%

# cases

%

# cases

6

32%

9

47%

4

21%

0

0%

19

6

38%

7

44%

2

13%

1

6%

16

7

47%

6

40%

2

13%

0

0%

15

11

38%

10

34%

7

24%

1

3%

29

injunction
Motion to
dismiss
Summary
judgment
Post-trial
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TABLE A3 ENTIRE FAIRNESS OUTCOMES BY PHASE
Plaintiff-friendly

Preliminary

Defendant-friendly

Neither

Standard not

Standard

applied

applied, met

Total

# cases

%

# cases

%

# cases

%

# cases

%

# cases

18

31%

28

47%

9

15%

4

7%

59

48

43%

49

44%

4

4%

11

10%

112

20

31%

34

52%

4

6%

7

11%

65

41

41%

28

28%

22

22%

8

8%

99

injunction
Motion to
dismiss
Summary
judgment
Post-trial
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